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CENTRAL ASPECTS OF THE DEBATE ON THE
COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Marcelo Dias Varella*
ABSTRACT
The way that actors create, implement, and control international law is far
more complex today than it was thirty years ago. International law has become
increasingly detailed and specific, as international relationships and
transnational legal processes have become more complex. The distinction
between national and international law is much less clear. States remain the
primary actors, but there has been a multiplication and intensification of the
role of sub-state and non-state actors. There is a continuous transformation of
international law, by both public and private mechanisms, from the national to
the international sphere and vice versa. The evolution of norms has also
become increasingly dense. Any discussion in this arena must contend with
new sources and new subjects of international law. This Recent Development
presents three scholarly contributions to this discussion. First, this Recent
Development analyzes new trends in the proliferation of norms, and how it
impacts our understanding and application of international law. It reveals
that: (1) there are multiple norms arising from new and old international
institutions and systems of integration; (2) it is now possible to more readily
integrate more states into the international legal system; and (3) international
law now progressively supersedes domestic law in many areas. Second, this
Recent Development proposes the possibility of new sources of international
law including networks of judges, state agents, and private companies and
other private actors. Subjects and participants must contend not only with
international law, but also with private or hybrid legal systems, which are
often autonomous of their host nation-states. International legal scholarship
frequently neglects these sources, even if they are vital to certain legal
subsystems, such as finance or monetary law. Third, this Recent Development
examines and summarizes some of the more controversial ideas on
international law today including: (1) global constitutionalism; (2) global
democracy; (3) complexity; and (4) fragmentation in international law. The
* Visiting Scholar, Berkeley Law, University of California; Professor of Law, University Center of
Brasília.
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discussion illustrates the limitations of these concepts in the real world, and
explores practical applications. This Recent Development surveys a spectrum
of global perspectives on these issues, and references articles from doctrinal
sources in a variety of countries including the United States, Germany,
France, United Kingdom, Japan, and Brazil.
INTRODUCTION
International legal theory is undergoing a major transformation in response
to globalization processes. The way that actors create, implement, and control
international law is far more complex today than it was thirty years ago. There
has been a corresponding intensification of the transnational legal process. The
distinction between national and international law has become less clear. States
continue to be the main actors in international law, but there has been a
multiplication and intensification of the role of sub-state and non-state actors.1
International law continuously traverses between the national and international
spheres, through both public and private instruments. Meanwhile, the process
through which norms evolve becomes increasingly dense. Therefore,
international relations have simultaneously become much more rule-oriented.2
However, international legal subsystems3 such as international economic
law (trade, finance, monetary), human rights law, humanitarian law, and
environmental law have not been transformed in the same direction (rationale,
rules of recognition, hierarchy) or at the same speed. International trade law
has internationalized much faster than others, such as human rights or
environmental law. Some states accept and participate in global integration
more intentionally and actively than others.4 Some authors suggest the idea of
“polychrony” in international law: differences in the “time” of each legal

1 FRANÇOIS OST & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, DE LA PYRAMIDE AU RESEAU. POUR UNE THEORIE
DIALECTIQUE DU DROIT 43–45 (2002).
2 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181, 184 (1996).
3 The concept of “system” changes according to the theory. Some Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese
authors use the definition of Norberto Bobbio, “ordenamento.” NORBERTO BOBBIO, POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO,
LIÇÕES DE FILOSOFIA DO DIREITO 198–99 (1995). French authors prefer the expression “ordre juridique” (legal
order). See id. Commentators in the Anglo-Saxon tradition use the term “legal system.” See, e.g., FRANÇOIS
OST & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, LEGAL SYSTEM BETWEEN ORDER AND DISORDER ix–x (Iain Stewart trans.,
Oxford University Press 1994). Most authors, including Kelsen, Hart, and Romano, use these terms as
synonyms. See id. at 10. I will follow them.
4 OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 3, at ix–x.
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subsystem create conflicts among them.5 A model once complicated (multiple
and heterogeneous) becomes overwhelming and complex (interactive and
unstable).6
Many different issues related to the transformation of international law
have consequences for the way that we understand it: the proliferation of
norms, the creation of new sources and subjects of international law, the limits
of some new meta ideas, global constitutionalism, global democracy, and
complexity versus fragmentation of international legal systems. Each of these
discussions is subject to intense debate and scholarly study nowadays,
including courses at the Hague Academy of International Law and other
important forums.7
In this Recent Development, I discuss fundamental points on three
important subjects. The first subject is the proliferation of norms, interpreted as
the multiplication of treaties, customs, and the unilateral acts of international
organizations and states. It is possible to integrate many more states into the
international legal system, with many norms arising from new and old
international organizations as well as the attribution of new capacities and
competencies from the national to the international level. However, even if this
integration is a clear process, it is impactful enough to change the way we
understand international law. The legal framework of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) is one example.8
The second subject of this paper, which receives more debate and achieves
less consensus, concerns the possibility of new sources of international law
arising from judicial networks, state agents, and private networks.9 Actors must
contend not only with international administrative law but also with private or
hybrid legal regimes that are autonomous in relation to states. International law
scholarship normally neglects this as a serious topic of study.10 However, in
5

MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM 133–48 (Naomi Norberg trans., Hart Publishing

2009).
6

See id.
See, e.g., Hague Academy of International Law 2013: Programme of the 2013 Session, HAGUE ACAD.,
http://www.hagueacademy.nl/download/Poster_2013_EN.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
8 See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
9 The discussion of whether or not new sources of international law have been created has been
presented by various authors. See, e.g., ONUMA YASUAKI, A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUESTIONING PREVALENT COGNITIVE FRAMEWORKS IN THE EMERGING MULTI-POLAR
AND MULTI-CIVILIZATION WORLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).
10 See, e.g., PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, L’UNITE DE L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL: COURS GENERAL
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2003).
7
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some legal subsystems, such as finance or monetary law, those new aspects are
important to understanding how they work.
The third subject of this paper is an analysis of the concepts of global
constitutionalism, global democracy, and complexity versus fragmentation in
international law. These are questions of faith more than questions of
argumentation. The main issues are hierarchy, recognition, plurality, or
complexity of norms and systems. Divergent discourses emerge from legal
scholars in Europe, the United States, and Asia, with strong and contradictory
arguments.11 We are far from consensus or from convincing arguments that
stand up to critique.
I. THE PROLIFERATION OF NORMS
Areas previously regulated by national laws or left unregulated are now the
objects of international law, regional systems of integration, international
organizations, or the law of other national legal systems with extraterritorial
effects. International and foreign themes have come to predominate over
national subjects.
There are four processes for the multiplication of norms—differing from
traditional treaty-making processes—by which international law engages state
actors: the inspiring influence of non-national law, the integrative influence of
regional and global legal systems, the imperative influence of international
law, and the extraterritorial influence of norms originating in powerful
countries. These are discussed in the Subparts below.
A. The Influence of Non-National Law
States adopt similar legal solutions regardless of whether international
actors prompt them to do so. They are influenced by a process of persuasion,
not imposition. Some authors consider the phenomenon as a “normative
intercrossing” or “cross-fertilization,” that is not only a set of similar national
frameworks,12 but a way to build international law. There are three different
modes of influence by which legal systems are transplanted from one
11

See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
GLOBALIZATION (2012); YASUAKI, supra note 9; Armin Von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International
Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L.
315 (2012).
12 See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LA REFONDATION DES POUVOIRS 153 (2007) (discussing the
internationalization of corporate responsibility).
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jurisdiction to another: international norms and organizations inspire national
law, international institutions stimulate the adoption of norms in their members
or even in non-members, and the national legal solutions of some states inspire
those of other states.13
Regarding international norms and organizations inspiring international
law, since the proliferation of international organizations, different states have
created institutions or norms to better manage new international legal
structures, even if they do not have the legal obligation to do so. There is an
intense process of normative cross-fertilization, motivated by the prestige or
reputation of some sources, the necessity to find solutions for similar problems,
expectations of effectiveness, and political or economic incentives.14 One
example is the effects of the WTO legal system on municipal law. In fact, the
expectations of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) interpretations, based
on previous legal reasoning, shape national public policies. In China, for
example, to avoid divergences among national courts, the national government
attempted to annul the autonomous power of provinces to rule against WTO
law, prohibited internal discretionary measures on economic and trade law, and
created jurisdictions to manage the interests of foreigners, internally named
“WTO courts.”15
In many other cases, international organizations induce or convince
countries to adopt national norms. In such cases, states do not see these norms
as a foreign model (ultra vires), and they do not fear retaliation, but they
identify those norms as the correct solution, or as a better solution, for a
common problem.16 In this situation, affected states do not even need to be
members of the international organization that influence their national norms.
One example is Brazil’s submission of its competition law and policy to the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) for peer
review.17 Under the OECD’s peer review process, states submit their national

13 Michele Graziadei, Legal transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRES L. 723 (2009).
14 Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, Legal Transplants and Comparative Law, 2 REVISTA
COLOMBIANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 261, 265 (2003).
15 MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L’UNIVERSEL 117 (2004); Julia Ya Chin, Trade, Investment
and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, 2007 CHINA QUARTERLY 720, 735–37.
16 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 964–65 (2005) (detailing how the
British came to ratify the Genocide Convention).
17 JAY SHAFFER, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], COUNTRY
STUDIES: BRAZIL – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (2005).
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norms for peer review to receive qualified criticism.18 They look to create
better conditions to improve their own domestic legal system.19 Partly in
response to criticisms received at the OECD, Brazil, which is not an OECD
member created a new competition law framework in 2011.20
A similar movement occurs when a state reproduces a solution
implemented nationally in another state. For example, the United States legal
framework on money laundering has become a worldwide model and a source
of inspiration for the OECD.21 This influence is frequently asymmetrical, since
Europe and the United States influence many more states than vice-versa.22
In addition, global administrative law is expanding fast. International legal
standards created by international organizations, networks of public
stakeholders, and networks of private actors provide minimum procedures to
be followed by states.23 States follow these standards by achieving a minimum
level of quality.24 They can then participate in these networks, reducing
transaction costs.25 There are many different examples of this approach, such
as Genetically Modified Organism guidelines (used to facilitate the trade of
commodities),26 patent analysis mechanisms,27 the International Organization
for Standardization,28 civil aviation regulations,29 and banking regulations.30

18

See id. at 3.
See id.
20 See Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 1.12.2011
(Braz.) (repealing Lei No. 9.781, de 19 de Janeiro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 20.01.1999
(Braz.); articles 5 and 6 of Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de Dezembro de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
28.12.1990 (Braz.); and articles 1 through 85, and 88 through 93 of Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.06.1994 (Braz.)).
21 Maira Machado, Similar in their Differences: Transnational Legal Processes Addressing Money
Laundering in Brazil and Argentina, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 330, 333, 338 (2012).
22 See id.
23 See generally NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010).
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 Id. at 189–222.
27 See, e.g., Jonathan Franklin, Electronic Resource Guide: International Intellectual Property Law, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L., http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=iipl#h.gkkqy1f8w9do (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
28 About ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
29 See, e.g., ICAO in Brief, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/Pages/icao-in-brief.aspx
(last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
30 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, International Standby Practices (ISP98): Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/477 (June 4, 1999), reprinted in [2000] 31 Y.B. UNCITRAL 579, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/2000.
19
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B. Regional and Global Systems of Integration
Systems of integration can be either regional or global. Global systems
concern a limited range of specific issues, which are arranged thematically.
Thematic integration involves many states on a specific topic, such as human
rights, trade, and the environment. By contrast, regional integration involves a
smaller set of states. Countless variations on these two models are possible.
Processes of integration proceed at multiple scales and speeds. At the
regional level, legal systems may integrate multiple issues in a coordinated
manner simultaneously, but each regional system has its own rationale.
Integration may also occur in an uncoordinated manner, involving multiple
subjects and a myriad of actors and fragmented processes, which also generate
a new complexity.
At the WTO alone, there are notifications of more than five hundred
integration processes.31 Integration processes are a tool to catalyze global
integration, providing a mechanism for meta objectives such as global free
trade, security, peace, and human rights. New legal spaces gradually emerge,
with uniform rules and rules of recognition.
The most advanced regional integration is carried out by the European
Union, which accepts the free circulation of people, goods, and factors of
production, along with monetary integration and intense cultural exchange.32
Other regional processes, such as MERSOCUR, ASEAN, or NAFTA, advance
more slowly.33 They seek to stimulate local production and reduce dependence
on other powers or regions.34 In the case of MERCOSUR, national public and
private actors have been attempting to improve regional trade and diversify
exports for more than ten years.35 Since then, regional trade has increased more
than tenfold, while political integration has not progressed.36 To sum up,
31 Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e.htm, (last visited May 4, 2013)(stating that “some 546 notifications of [Regional Trade
Agreements] . . . had been received by the GATT/ WTO”).
32 See Fraser Cameron, The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration 1 (Council on Foreign
Relations, Working Paper, 2010); see also DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMUNICATIONS, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS passim (2012).
33 See Sergio Fabbrini, European Regionalism in Comparative Perspective: Features and Limits of the
New Medievalis [sic] Approach to Word [sic], 14 AGORA WITHOUT FRONTIERS 438, 456–66 (2009).
34 See id.
35 See id. at 459.
36 Balança Comercial – Mercosul, COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/
interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=2081 (follow “Série histórica – Mercosul: 1989 a 2013” hyperlink) (last
visited May 4, 2013).
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regional systems of integration are more than intermediary steps to political
integration, and must be understood as valuable legal tools to implement
national political economic strategies.37
Europe is a laboratory, a locus for experimentation of new ways of
integration that holds positive and negative lessons for other regional systems
and for globalization debates.38 Over forty years, the European Union has
created over one-hundred thousand norms.39 Its economic interdependencies
are extremely powerful. It has become unrealistic for a state to consider
abandoning the Europe Union, considering the importance of economic
interdependence among member countries. The recent economic crisis and the
possibility of Greece exiting from the Euro common currency reflect the
effects that this could have on the global economy.40
European integration can teach lessons about “flexibility” in international
economic law. The European Union has promoted tolerance going back to the
time of adaptation required by states as they internalized supranational rules.
Different layers of norms permit integration in a variable geometry. Instead of
a federation of states, there is supranational governance.41 Instead of a
constitution, there are constitutionalization processes.42 European institutions
and politicians avoid discussing the replacement of solid institutions such as
sovereignty, federalism, and nationality in the name of the maintenance of
multicultural and local powers. The simultaneous improvement of local and
global power is known as a “glocalization” process.43

37

See generally ALICE ROCHA

DA

SILVA, L’ARTICULATION

COMMERCIAUX REGIONAUX (2012).
38 See Jürgen Habermas, TIME OF TRANSITIONS

ENTRE L’OMC ET LES ACCORDS

96 (2006).
Number of laws, EUABC, http://en.euabc.com/word/2152 (last visited May 5, 2013).
40 See, e.g., Agustino Fontevecchia, Don’t Forget Europe: Greek Euro Exit Possible as Athens Protests
Austerity, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/11/06/dontforget-europe-greek-eu-exit-possible-as-athens-protests-austerity/.
41 Wilhelm Lehmann, Supranational Decision-Making Procedures, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 2011),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.4.1.pdf.
42 See generally Frank Schimmelfennig et al., Condititons for EU Constitutionalization: A Qualitative
Comparative Analysis, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1168 (2006) (presenting a quantitative analysis of EU
constitutionalization processes).
43 See generally Agata Kozlowska, European Unity Through “Glocalization,” 5 PRAGUE J. CENT. EUR.
AFF. 10 (2003) (arguing that Europe is glocalizing, and not globalizing).
39
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The concept of a national margin of appreciation is another cornerstone of
European integration.44 Courts permit the flexible interpretation of
communitarian concepts according to national specificities.45 As political
actors consider whether it is possible to advance a specific subject, they close
the national margin, reducing the states’ possibilities for different local
interpretations of the same supranational rule. A national margin of
appreciation is an escape valve for the strongest national tensions, because it
(1) allows for different interpretations of the same legal text, according to the
legal environment, (2) pacifies cultural conflicts, (3) allows for the coexistence of common rules, and (4) respects differences in the time necessary
to absorb and internalize regional rules.46 This legal scenario creates a Europe
à la carte, in which states can chose the most appropriate legal framework for
their particular realities.
The idea of national margin of appreciation resembles the idea of accepted
level of risk found in the Agreement on the Appreciation of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.47 In applying the concepts of a national margin of
appreciation or a national level of acceptance of risk, respectively, states may
choose how to implement an international rule according to their
particularities, but only if the international legal framework admits diverse
interpretations.48 This process is more prevalent in European integration than
in international economic law.
C. The Expansion of Imperative Norms
Imperative norms can be understood as the peremptory norms of
international law, combined with other norms to which states must attend to
survive in an international scenario. The recognition of international
peremptory norms is a recent movement; acceptance of the concept is
increasing. The international courts and tribunals only recognized these norms
in 1990.49 Even if the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had the opportunity
to consolidate peremptory norms after the fall of the Berlin wall, international
44 Mireille
Delmas-Marty & Marie-Laure Izorche, Marge nationale d’appréciation et
internationalisation du droit. Réflexions sur la validité formelle d’un droit commun pluraliste, 52 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 753, 755–56 (2000).
45 Id. at 754.
46 Id. at 760.
47 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
48 Compare text accompanying notes 45–46, with SPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 10.
49 See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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courts and tribunals have assumed a strong position only in the last twenty
years.50 This addition to the milieu of international law is thus very recent. The
concept of the “imperative norm of international law” was born in 1970, in the
Barcelona Traction case, but without a detailed conceptualization.51 Similarly,
in 1979, in the case of diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States
in Tehran, the ICJ identified some “imperative obligations” of international
law, without providing much detail to the concept.52
Different courts recognized institutions such as the European Court of
Human Rights in 1998 (Al-Adsani case)53 and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in different cases. It was only in 1996, when deciding the
legality of using nuclear weapons, that the ICJ recognized the existence of an
inviolable ensemble of international norms, imposable on all states,
independent of ratification.54 In 2006, in the Congo v. Rwanda case, the
concept was finally recognized as a part of international law.55
50

See id.
See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, 304 (Feb. 5) (separate
opinion of Judge Ammoun).
52 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7, 20 (Dec. 15).
53 See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 4–5.
54 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 83
(discussing the concept of jus cogens).
55 Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 267, 272 (2009). For other instances of the recognition of the jus cogens category of international
norms, see Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, para. 153 (Dec. 10, 1998); Juridical
Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 18, passim (Sept. 17, 2003). Within the Congo v. Rwanda case, Judge Koroma expounded on jus cogens
and erga omnes norms, as follows:
51

Hence, in my judgment, a State which denies the Court’s jurisdiction to enquire into allegations
alleging violation of the Convention would not be lending the co-operation required to “liberate
mankind from the odious scourge” of genocide or to fulfill the object and purpose of the
Convention. Denying recourse to the Court essentially precludes judicial scrutiny into the
responsibility of a State in a dispute relating to the violation of the Convention. 22. This point is
of particular cogency in this case concerning Rwanda, a State where genocide took place and
which justifiably called on the United Nations Security Council to set up an international
criminal tribunal to try those who committed the crime against a section of its population. It will
thus not be in keeping with the spirit and objective of the Convention to refuse to allow judicial
consideration of the allegation of genocide perpetrated in another country because Rwanda itself
or its agents are alleged to be responsible. While this is not to claim that the seriousness of an
obligation, the jus cogens status of a norm or the erga omnes nature of an obligation per se
confers jurisdiction on the Court, as was recognized in the Judgment, it is nevertheless my
opinion that it is incumbent on Rwanda in this case, as a State party to the Genocide
Convention—and which itself was a victim of genocide and rightly referred the matter to the
competent organ of the United Nations—to allow scrutiny of the allegation that it had breached
its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
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The norms of international economic law are not considered to be
peremptory. However, most states deem it necessary to be part of the WTO, in
order to protect themselves from unilateral sanctions by more powerful states,
as has often happened in the past.56
D. The Extraterritorial Influence of the Norms of Powerful Countries
Powerful states can impose norms on other states. This usually happens
when there is a dependency relationship or political pressure, or when the costs
of non-implementation are too severe, as a function of bilateral agreements
between private actors. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom,
for example, have different rules with extraterritorial effects to combat
corruption and regulate certain processes of industrial production, labor
standards, and national security.57 These rules are intended to punish domestic
enterprises or even foreign enterprises or individuals that commit crimes in
other countries.
As is the case for many other hard issues in internationalization of law, the
imposition of national rules is associated with significant crises. Terrorism
crises lead some countries to impose security models on the rest of the word.
The economic crisis and the financial crisis in the last ten years have had
similar consequences. In 2002, as a function of the financial crisis and fraud
scandals involving such entities as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Peregrine
Systems, and Tyco International, the United States enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.58 The use of the same U.S. accountability standards from private
companies makes it possible to have access to credit with better interest rates.
In some cases, the extraterritorial norm is in conflict with other national norms.
An example is the motivation of an employee to denounce his enterprise when
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 1, 61 (Feb. 3)
(Koroma, J., dissenting).
56 See JOHN JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY AND
ECONOMICS RELATIONS 39 n.33 (2000).
57 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006)
(containing provisions commonly known as the Anti-Bribery provisions); Council Regulation 2271/96,
Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country,
and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC). Cf. D. Alison von Rosenvinge,
Global Anti-Corruption Regimes: Why Law Schools may Want to Take a Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 10
GERMAN L.J. 785, 787, 789 (2009).
58 See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917 (2003) (tracing
the impetus for enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through analysis of the legal strategy pursued by Arthur
Andersen).
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he knows corporate misconduct has taken place. Whereas the United States
generally promotes such disclosures, France typically protects secret corporate
acts.59
Finally, the extraterritoriality of rules also significantly affects the
processes of production. The classical example is the prohibition by some
states of the importation of certain products produced in an undesirable
manner. The most significant forum to discuss the legality of these national
restrictive measures is the WTO, where such measures are decided in
accordance with article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.60
There are cases, such as those concerning the importation of shrimp and tuna,
in which the importer succeeded in imposing its national legal framework on
the exporter, with the consent of the WTO.61
In sum, the unilateral acts of some international organizations have become
more powerful than ever. Resolutions of the Security Council, decisions and
interpretative declarations of the WTO, and decisions of regional and global
courts infuse the international legal system with many other norms that either
are new or were previously not important enough to be considered legally
binding. The multiplication of norms means a multiplication of soft and hard
laws, with different degrees of compliance and methods of enforcement. This
new international legal scenario today is only possible with the legal
mechanisms outlined above.
II. NEW SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The legal framework constituting international law comes not only from
treaties, customs, principles, and unilateral acts of states and international
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Ian L. Schaffer, An International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle: When the
Extraterritorial Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829, 1834, 1852–54
(2006).
60 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
61 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, para. 186, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct.12, 1998) (holding that “[a]lthough the measure of the United
States in dispute . . . serves an environmental objective that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of
article XX of the GATT 1994, this measure has been applied by the United States in a manner which
constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination”); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, para. 407, WT/DS381/AB/R
(May 16, 2012) (finding that the United States’ objective of “contributing to the protection of dolphins, by
ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins” is legitimate, but that the United States’ “dolphin-safe” labelling provisions were inconsistent
with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement).

VARELLA GALLEYSFINAL

2013]

6/19/2013 11:55 AM

COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

13

organizations. New processes of normative construction have also arisen from
the process of the internationalization of law. The internationalization of law is
different from the construction of international law. It is a process that emerges
from the national sphere to the international sphere, crosses national spheres
without passing through international law, or passes through transnational
private law, crossing or ignoring all national and international laws.62 Different
forms of dialogue take place, from which emerge a common legal grammar,
constitutional confluence, cross-fertilization between judges, and private legal
networks with pretensions of autonomy in relation to the state legal system.
A. Common Legal Grammar
The first step to a dialogue is to know the meaning of the expressions used
by other interlocutors. In legal studies, such understandings are usually
produced in comparative law. On one hand, the rise of common legal concepts
results from different processes: the intensification of the use of the same
expressions in different legal instruments; the creation of lists of meanings in
treaties, national norms, and private contracts; the reduction of the possibility
of imposing interpretative clauses during ratification; and the strengthening of
the single undertaking mechanism. On the other hand, the intensification of
new concepts comes from communication processes in transnational private
networks.
The increasing use of uniform, singular expressions has been particularly
valuable in the case of emergent legal concepts. The precautionary principle,
the accepted level of risk, and the national margin of appreciation are common
examples. The precautionary principle was born in Britain and in Germany in
the 1970s.63 During the 1980s and especially the 1990s, it diffused quickly in
many national and international courts and treaties, mainly in trade,
environmental and sanitary, and phytosanitary norms, as a principle of law.64
Using a common meaning reduces the possibilities of interpretation of legal
expressions at the national level. In second-level analysis, such a term might be
used to define a more complex concept, such as the possibility of using the
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See, e.g., DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 12, at 153.
Akawat Laowonsiri, Application of the Precautionary Principle in the SPS Agreement, 14 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 565, 568 (2010).
64 Id. at 568–70.
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“zeroing” technique to identify dumping.65 In this case, two contrasting views
of the “zeroing” concept spread worldwide. First, American authorities, in
imposing legal concepts in regulatory law, employed the term “zeroing.”66
Many countries started to use the same definition and corresponding method,
mainly because the U.S. adopted the most anti-dumping measures.67 Attitudes
toward the concept were only changed after discussion in another relevant
forum, the WTO.68 Thus, there was a limitation of the legal concept.69 This
process became more intense with the proliferation and globalization of
transnational communities in different areas.
The principle of the single undertaking also has a significant role because it
prompts the creation of a common definition by dispute settlement
mechanisms, when different states have different interpretations of the same
concept. This was prevalent at the WTO, not only because of the direct effect
of its decisions on parties, but also because of the effect of WTO decisions on
cases outside of the WTO forum.70 The process is salient because of the
importance of precedents for future cases inside the organization, its legitimacy
to other forums, and, moreover, because of the migration of WTO judges and
panelists to other private mechanisms to settle conflicts.71
There are various reasons for the legitimacy of DSB/WTO. The first is the
highly legal technicality of their decisions.72 Second, the decisions of the WTO
are coherent, since DSBs maintain consistency in their interpretations of WTO
law.73 All reports are founded in precedent.74 Since the first reports, there has
been an effort to build uniform interpretations, looking at how different legal

65 For a definition of the “zeroing” technique, see Sungjoon Cho, No More Zeroing?: The United States
Changes its Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.asil.org/
pdfs/insights/insight120309.pdf.
66 See id.
67 See, e.g., id. (discussing the European Community’s use of zeroing against bed linens imported from
India).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, WTO DECISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT IN
U.S. LAW 5–6 (2007) (delineating provisions in the United states’ Uruguay Round Agreements Act that “set[ ]
out requirements for administrative implementation of adverse WTO decisions.”).
71 See, e.g., José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: the
Creation of International Legal Fields, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, no. 4, 2011 at 1, 13–14.
72 Adrian T.L. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
171, 174–75 (1998).
73 Id.
74 Id.
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systems use international law and its rule of interpretation.75 Yet, where there
was no obligation to follow precedent, DSBs maintain their previous
interpretations, building a hybrid system that uses continental and common law
rationale at the same time.76
In any case, the WTO adjudication system is largely sealed off, and uses
international law only in a subsidiary way, as with the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties There is also an apparent impartiality. It is not possible to
affirm that there are political preferences in favor of powerful states, or
politically-sensitive themes. The rate of confirmation of irregularities is
practically the same between all groups of states. In a certain way, some
sensitive themes, such as environmental protection, had more elastic
interpretations of some legal concepts, but these were not new since they
followed previous models consolidated in American and in European courts.
When the WTO specifies a legal concept, it travels towards national policy
makers, who start to use the same concept nationally.77
B. Constitutional Confluence
Internationalization of law can occur with the emergence of global legal
values. It does not depend on any treaty but is the result of an expansion of
values, in a normative intercrossing logic. Through different processes for the
constitutionalization of new values, states incorporate into their constitutions
similar provisions that are motivated by a single concern. It is a weighty
phenomenon, since almost one-third of the states of the world reformed their
constitutions after the 1980s.78 With the expansion of the democratic western
model in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, and the reduction of dictatorships
in Latin America, there was a new space for the introduction of new subjects
into constitutions.79

75

Id. at 178–82.
Id.
77 See WTO Analytical Index—Guide to WTO Law and Practice, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.
org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e.htm (last visited May 4, 2013) (providing a
portal to the WTO’s “comprehensive guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by the
Appellate Body, dispute settlement panels and other WTO bodies”).
78 PAOLO BISCARETTI DI RUFFÌA, INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COMPARADO 520–23
(1996).
79 See Stephen Chee, Southeast Asia in 1988: Portents for the Future, 1989 SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF. 3,
12–13; Dirk Kruijt, Low Intensity Democracies: Latin America in the Post-Dictatorial Era, 20 BULL. LATIN
AM. RES. 409, 412–13 (2001).
76
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Constitutional norms are the object of a reinterpretation process. New
global values, which are becoming common to many countries, inspire similar
constitutional reforms and reinterpretations of constitutional texts.80 Yet,
constitutional texts have an objective materiality.81 Their meaning is the
express object of interpretation, giving a certain margin of flexibility to the
interpreter. Intangible norms permeate many constitutional and supranational
legal frameworks.82
C. Dialogue of Judges
A dialogue of judges can occur through several mechanisms: from the
process of recognition and the self-imposition of limits; with the cognition of
foreign law and its decisions; in the definition of foreign or international
jurisdiction in case of conflicts; in recognition of decisions taken in other
states; and, in a more sophisticated way, with the concern about how law is
applied in different states. This process makes it possible to build similar
interpretations, contributing to a common or at least similar law.
Some authors believe that there is an informal community of judges who
exchange ways of thinking about the law, how to apply international law in
national courts, and how to take decisions with extraterritorial effects.83 Others
believe in an openness of judges to a global communication process and point
to it as one of the most valuable pillars for a global legal community that is
strong enough to link fragmented spaces of global law.84 Finally, other authors
maintain that dialogue is one action of liberal countries involving judges who
share common concerns with the building of world law, with valid precedent to
the entire judiciary transnational community.85
D. The Emergence of a Global Public Sphere
There is an integration process of networks of domestic and international
actors responsible for the creation, implementation, and control of public and
private policies. They adopt common solutions as methods for public
management, poverty reduction, violence control, and so on. This
communicative environment reveals a public sphere. The way to produce this
80
81
82
83
84
85

See OST & VAN DER KERCHOVE, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 59.
See, e.g., id. at 437.
See, e.g., DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 5, at 41–43.
See generally MARCELO NEVES, TRANSCONSTITUCIONALISMO (2009).
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 74–75 (2004).
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law, common to different states, is different from the production method of
traditional sources of international law. They have their own compliance and
enforcement mechanisms. To understand international law nowadays, it is
necessary to study diversity.86
A similar concept in liberal logic was proposed by some authors87 and this
Recent Development responds to criticisms that the original concepts are
limited to liberal countries. There exists a continuous creative process directed
toward empowerment through multiple spheres: institutional and political
spheres; progressive mechanisms to ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes;
civil and political rights and equal access to courts; rule of law; private
property protected from state activity; dense networks of transnational relations
between individuals and groups; and informal linkages among elites from
different countries (bureaucratic, economics, scientific, and so on).88 Global
administrative law and mutual recognition regimes seem to advance different
aspects of a possible global public sphere.
E. Private Normative Regimes
Private regimes also produce law, with major or minor autonomy in
relation to state law and international law. The autonomy comes from the
capacity to implement decisions taken in a private sphere. We find this in
transnational networks, as well as inside domestic arenas. The relationship
between these autonomous regimes and (inter) state law can be indifference,
opposition, or collaboration89
For this Recent Development, the most central aspect of private
international networks is the passage through national environments.90 States
remain the elements of coordination among national legal orders; however,
other transnational networks become relevant. The legal conception becomes
thematic instead of territorial.91 In the periphery, most of the time, law that is
created by enterprises, non-state organs, and contracts, non-state organs, and
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See generally id.
See José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12
EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 186–87 (2001) (summarizing the liberal logic proposed by Anne-Marie Slaughter).
88 Cf. id.
89 See generally MARCELO D. VARELLA, INTERNACIONALIZAÇÃO DO DIREITO (2013).
90 Hans Kelsen, Les Rapports de Système entre le Droit Interne et le Droit International Public, 14
RECUEIL DE COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, no. 4, 1926 at 227.
91 JÜRGEN HABERMAS ET AL., A CONSTELAÇÃO PÓS-NACIONAL: ENSAIOS POLÍTICOS 41 (2001).
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contracts has intrinsic validity, and its validity is not dependent on the state.92
The main engine for it is civil society and not political society. The
dissemination of a global law comes from the periphery of the system and not
from its center. The validity is not from the state, but from expectations of
actors that are strong enough to assure the legitimacy and effectiveness of its
norms.93
Some legal networks—such as lex mercatoria, lex electronica, lex
financiera, and lex deportiva—have density and relevance. Each of these
networks has its own rationale. Not only are these networks independent of
states, but in many cases they gain power from interactions with states.94
*
There is a factual problem: International law needs these networks to exist,
and depends on these legal manifestations to be effective. Sometimes this rule
is considered legitimate by large communities (territorialized or not), and it is
effective. To sum up, we cannot conceive international law today without these
new forms of normative manifestations.
There are three main obstacles to understanding these sub-national, private,
and public norms as sources of international law. First, the category “source of
international law” has an established meaning among internationalists, with a
precise definition.95 Second, it is impossible to link states with such norms.
Third, there will be many consequences to international legal theory that are
hard to assume. We will focus only on this last point.
If we assume that there are new sources of international law, we must admit
that the actors who produce those sources are subjects of international law. As
a result, national judges, civil servants, enterprises, and NGOs would be new
subjects of international law. Beyond that, it would be impossible to identify a
limit to what is a source of international law, since any contract or norm
created by a small network would be able to be considered a new source. If
everyone and everything could be a subject and a source, nobody and nothing
would be. The concept, along with any theory attached to it, loses its meaning.
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See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 85, at 160.
See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (discussing lex mercatoria).
94 See id. at 9–11.
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In any case, even if we assume the idea that there are not new sources of
international law, the legal framework today poses new challenges. The idea of
a pyramid does not correspond to the image of international law today.
Hierarchy is not only normative but varies according to each subsystem. The
international system is no longer linear, since the rules of recognition could
vary and be different at the same time. The possibility of an international legal
system presupposes juxtapositions of international orders, in different layers,
crossed by different normative discourses. The reception of different rules
depends on the subject and source but not the nature of norm itself. The ideas
of monism and dualism are not enough to understand the international legal
system. The idea of networks seems to be more adequate.96
III. QUESTIONS OF FAITH: FRAGMENTATION OR COMPLEXITY,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
Various discussions attempt to use consolidated categories at a national
level to apply them to the international arena. Most of the time they have failed
because any transposition is impossible at the stage of disorder in a postnational time. One solution proposed by many authors is to change a
consolidated concept and so represent civil society as constitutionalized or
democratic or the legal order as global.
A first idea is the notion of human community, replacing the modern
concept of the state community. This is a seductive notion, but it has its
problems. It requires a presupposition that a legal order is intended for human
beings directly and not for the states. The process is still more complex, with
the densification of legality that oscillates between two different visions for the
source of international law—one intended for human beings and the other for
states.97 In that case, there would be two parallel legal systems, one interhuman, and another inter-state.98 The first one presupposes the idea of a vast
human community.99 The second one presupposes a community of states
without a center.100 These two different visions oscillate between authors and
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See OST & VAN DER KERCHOVE, supra note 1, at 43.
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their visions of the legal system, creating antagonisms, as the human
community could be sometimes against the community of the states.101
Another group of authors identifies different legal orders, confronting
subsystems of international law or those subsystems with non-state systems,
such as private legal regimes. They question the usefulness of the legal system
concept, in the face of the idea of a multiplicity of autonomous legal orders.
The idea of an eventual conflict between autonomous legal subsystems
supports the notion of fragmentation.102 One aspect of fragmentation is the
possibility of conflict among different international courts. There would be
“nomadic floating legal entities, totally autonomous, in a legal ether.”103
Another aspect of fragmentation would be, maybe more relevantly, three
conflicts of rationale: among different subsystems; between a subsystem and
individual actors in a global society; and within a subsystem and its own
rational standards understood as necessary to expansion.104
In another way, many other authors, looking at the same reality, seem
connected between subsystems, with different elements to bridge them, such as
the importance of judges, the efforts to avoid direct conflict, and dialogue
among international organizations, private actors, states, and domestic law.105
The second idea is constitutionalization. Authors who identify a global
constitution, or many different global constitutions, need to choose between
different definitions of what constitutes a constitution. From a normative
perspective, the definition would be the fundamental rule that defines the way
public authority must be exercised106 or the “sum of basic . . . legal norms
which comprehensively regulate the social and political life of a polity.”107
There is no global constitutionalism for many reasons, including
asymmetry of power between the powerful states; absence of clear division of
powers (legislative, executive, and judiciary) at a global level; and difficulties
101

Id. at 213.
See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Fragmentation du Droit International ou des Perceptions qu’on en a?, 2
(EUI Working Papers, LAW No. 2006/14).
103 Id. (translated from the original French, which reads, “sortes de monades juridiques flottant, totalement
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104 TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 81.
105 See discussion infra Part III.
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POLITIQUE ET DIPLOMATIQUE OU BIBLIOTHEQUE QUE DE L’HOMME-D’ÉTAT ET DU CITOYEN 56 (1780).
107 Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2006).
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in determining the organic competence, the material dominium, and the
capacity of a general protection of human rights according to pre-established
procedures. The United Nations Security Council lacks legitimacy, and there is
no constitutional people, or any functional equivalent, that would permit
generalized support where there is no cultural homogeneity, common political
founders’ myths, a public sphere, or similar forms of representation.108
However, according to the concept of the constitution, it is possible to
identify many different constitutions that assume the same reality. Gunther
Teubner, for example, identifies multiple constitutional fragments, considering
the idea of Niklas Luhmann on the constitution as an element to connect law
and politics.109 According to Teubner, Luhmann’s theory is not enough to
explain the reality of international law. In this vision, every international legal
subsystem (WTO, human rights, environment, lex mercatoria, lex electronica,
and so on), would create its own mechanisms for identifying its rules, creating
hierarchies, and enforcing its decisions.110
The challenge would be to create a common global law that could admit
different sources of legal norms, sometimes conflicting, in a way that respects
cultural diversity. Nevertheless, the advance of multiple constitutional
fragments does not reveal a better, fairer, or more democratic world.
In this thinking, there would be two possible destinations for the
archipelago of constitutional fragments: autonomization or coordination. For
autonomization, we understand the enhancing of the sectoral rationale and the
exacerbation of antagonisms. For coordination, we understand the building of
“meta-meta rules” capable of creating bridges of dialogue among sectoral
constitutional fragments. The presence of environmental concerns to WTO
judges would be an example of these bridges. However, it is impossible to
know which path to follow. Any conclusion is a question of futurology.
Finally, it is only possible to identify democracy in a global world if there
is a change in the concept of democracy that we have used for at least two
hundred years. We found different authors using other definitions for
democracy, including the idea of accountability, transparency, and human
rights achievements. These concepts could be related to legitimacy or
effectiveness, but not to democracy. There is no democracy in international
108
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law or its institutions for three main reasons: there is a great distance between
decision-makers and the subjects of the decisions in the international arena; the
majority of countries and the population of the world are excluded from the
decision-making process; and the creation of law and power is much greater
and more complex than the decisions taken by the United Nations and a few
international organizations.111
CONCLUSION
The legal scenario today is in transformation. As Mireille Delmas-Marty
suggests, it is like a windy sky with clouds, in constant mutation.112 When we
identify a shape, the reality has already changed. It is impossible to describe
the reality, because at the same time we identify flashes of fragmentation in
international law with many antagonisms.
It is possible also to propose a new rationale for the global legal system. In
the last case, this new rationale would be much more complex, with a new
coordination of relationships, new sources, and new subjects of law.
The difficulty is to reveal the linkages between sources, subjects, regional
systems of integration, and mechanisms of dispute settlement in a new
complexity of international law.113 In that “carnival of principles,”114 with
different criteria of identity, the unity of the legal system is not logical, but
political.115 The complexity of international law is related to the necessity of
explaining how the traditional concepts and ideas that sustain international
legal theory can survive the actual post-national legal relations scenario.

111 Onuma Yasuaki, reacting to this text when I presented this piece at Georgetown University,
highlighted the idea that all these non-state norms could not be considered legitimate and democratic. I agree
with him. However, his argument cannot be used as a reason to not consider them as norms, recognized by
different communities of actors.
112 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Au pays des nuages ordonnées, 1 REVUE ASPECTS 13, 14 (2008).
113 William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 964 (2004).
114 Luiz Fernando Barzotto, Razão de Lei. Contribuição a uma Teoria do Princípio da Legalidade, 3
REVISTA DE DIREITO DA GV 219, 240 (2007) (translated from the original Portuguese, which reads, “carnaval
principiológico”).
115 Id. at 240–41.

